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SECRET

ER1241/29 /G

FROM R.C. Treweeks

Ministry of Defence (D.I.S.)

-Goodison

No. 230/130 AL13/1

Dated Aug 26th

Received

Sept 8th

SUBJECT:

D.I.S. comments on aspects of Israeli nuclear activity - report of agreement with Argentine for purchase of uranium concentrate. no evidence to support view that Israelis have chemical separation plant and unlikely that it would be housed in reactor building

Encloses Copy of:

References and Relevant Papers:

-115G.
-126G.

(Outward Action)

Dft) A.R.H. Kellas, Tel Aviv
H. McGoodison 9/9

8c) Hon P.E. Ramsbotham Paris.
P.R.H. Wright, Washington
D.J. Maitland Cairo
8) R.C. Treweeks M.O.D.
A.W. Redpath C.R.O.
} 9/9

MINUTES

CMG 11/9.

(Printing Instructions)

(Referred to Legal Adviser)

(Action completed)

14-9-64

(Main Indexed)

Dest 1/2/66

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From: R. C. Treweeks

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Metropole Buildings, Northumberland Avenue, LONDON W.C.2

Telephone: WHItehall 8474, *ext.* 31

Please address any reply to
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF
(S.I. 52)

26th August, 1964.

and quote: 230/130 AL 13/1

Dear Goodison,

Thank you for the copy of your letter to Kellas in Tel Aviv of 29th April and Kellas' reply of 6th July, 1964. Three points emerge:

First, all available evidence shews that the Canadian report concerning negotiation for an "agreement" between Israel and the Argentine for the purchase of 80-100 tons of Argentine uranium concentrate was incorrect. There may have been exploratory conversations to this end, but of an actual "agreement" there is no evidence to support the Canadian report.

Second, there is little evidence available in D.I.S. to support the view that the Israelis have a chemical separation plant in working order. We have a suspicion that the building described by the Americans in their second visit as a "laundry" may be intended as a separation plant but, if we accept the now detailed statement from the third American visit at its face value, the building can hardly have had appropriate equipment in it at the time of the visit.

Last, Kellas' suggestion that the chemical separation plant could be housed in the reactor building is very unlikely. Chemical separation is a tricky business and, on past experience of the nuclear programme, requires to be housed in a building of its own.

Yours sincerely
R.C. Treweeks

for A.D. D.I.(S.I.)52

A. C. Goodison, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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